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INTRODUCTION
The history of humanity has been
closely associated with the sea. Even
disregarding the theory that attributes
the birth of organic life to that salty
environment, one cannot deny that
through the blue and green expanses of
water, different streams of civilizations
marked the road of history along the
centuries. But man's primary interest in
the oeean has been as a means of
transportation or communication.
Scientific know lege of the sea began
as recently as a century ago ("Challenger" expedition, 1872-76). After
such a relatively recent start, interest in
the importance of the oceans grew
greatly as funds were invested in better
knowledge of them. That is particularly
true among the main world powers.
Though exploration gave varied results,
increased knowledge raised new qucs·
tions and indicatcd newer and hcavicr
demands. Later, a real tridimensional
scientific scope posed new challenges, as

indicated by recent views of the oceans
as a "world granary. "
Advances in outer and inner space
(or hydrosphere) are closely related to
scientific and technological progress.
Also, both involve difficult operational
environments. They both require careful
planning. Inefficiencies and errors are
not tol!:rateu. Research is very expen·
sive. Sophisticated instrumentation is
needed. Also, both require highly quali.
fied personnel on a eomparatively large
scale of the total of persons employed.
The conquest of both spaces began
after the "population explosion" was
noted. This latter phenomenon added
an increasing amount of tensions all
over the world. The need for vital space
and the search for supremacy in the
world opened areas for friction or major
disputes in this tense world. Countries
with the most advanced operational
know· how an~ in the hetlt position for
achieving slIecm,:s. I t is not surprising,
thcn, to find reasons to conquer new
environments other than the reasons of
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humanitarian wit'h('s for more food.
mon: space, and waLcr for (!vcry human
Iwing or Lh(' inLcllcr.Lual rcasons in
sean'h of :>cienLifie knowledgc.
Five·seveIlLlu; of Lhc world's :>nrface
is ('(lv('red hy the oceans. III charaeLl'r,
Lwo OCl'an environmenLs can be di:;Lingui~hcd. One is that eXLension of the
mainland sloping under waLer to a relaLively abrupl ehange in hoLLom slope;
Lhe oLher eXLends heyond Lhal hOllnrlury and cncolII pasges the larger und
ahys:,al oc('uni(' (It'pLhs. The first urea is
Lhl' COlllillt'nLul Shdf; Lhl' laLLer is Lhe
lwlngir 100m'.
(l I' thl'';l' two. hl'CnUl'I' of th(' II'SSl'r
(It-pth::; ulld nl'nrlll'SS to till' eonst, the
Con Lim'n Lal Sht:! f will hI! increasingly
imporLant. The open seas will conLinue
to hI' primary areas for oecan transporLaLion of goods hclwecn conLincnLs and,
Lherefore, areas of military dispuLe for
Lheir protccLion.
The discussion of factors affecting
thc Conlinental Shdf and c1ucidation of
its imporLance from a straLegic viewpoinL arc the main pnrposes of this
rrsrarch. In Ihr pfl~s(ml world, strategy
('m),ral'I's sl'vernl :ISPI'ds that iuvolve tIll:
proj,'('lion of (,fforl,; from fil'ltfs appnn'ntly tliscounl'I'lt'ti from till' ,;pceifi,'
military onl'. 111'111'1', (I!II' Ilisl'ul','lion will
IHlVIl to ('(lVI~r sl'VI'r:ll an'as othl~r Ihml
that of our primary concern prior to
any allcmpl to draw conclusions.

I-THE CONTINENTAL SHELVES:
THEIR PHYSICAL
CHARACTERISTICS
The advent of modern devices of
!>()unding permitted a beLter understanding of the sea relief in this cenLury with
the introducLion of echo sounds. WiLh
Ihrsc means, helter than ever before, il
was sern lhaL when approaching Lhe
rllm,ls frolll the deep sea an area of
rnpidly dl'crcusing depths and a followinl! l'omparntl\'e1y fluL hoLLom preceded
Ihl' inllnedillll! lll'lIl'h or rOllsllinc. TIll!
11ILLl'r naL area was mcnLioned in 1887

hy II ugh R, :\ Till us thr Con tincnlul
Shdf. 1 The ahrupt lransition of deplhs
is the arell named Continenlul Slope; ils
inner limit is about the 100-fathom or
200-meter isohath.
The Inll:rnllLionlll I1ydrogr:lphic
Bureau, throllgh iLs InternaLional CommiLLee on the Nomenclature of Ocean
Bottom Features (22 Septemher 1952),
defines the Continental Shelf as the
1o0ne hordl:ring eonlinents from the low
wlllerline to a depth at which a relativ('I), Stl'l'P slope tow:lrds thc drep
regions is fouud. It locates thal sharprr
in(Tral-'e in d('pth around 100 faLhoms
or ~OO metl'rs hut rt'l'()~nizl's thaI il ean
ol'cur at mon' than ~O(} or II':<s than h!l
falhoms. ) Lalso r(:cogni1ocs llll: l~lInlincn
lal borderland where the marginal area
is irregular and has much larger depths
than those mentioned for a Continental
Shelf.2
The Continental Shelf was found to
vary in width and depth in different
areas of the world, but it shows some
limiLed confined rangl! of variation.
Also, shores of YOllng e1evaled mounlainolls regions havI~ a narrow shelf or
lal'l;, it. Thosl: cliffl!rl:llt~cs makl~ il diffi('lilt to ('slahlish an :le('urall~ lIud clllnpn'lwnsin: ddiuilion of Ihl' lJIorphulo~iealph"n()u\enou.

TIll: area significance of the ConlincnLal Shelves' is ilulieated hy the facl
that they represent 7.6 pcrcent of the
total ocean surface,3 or about 20 percent of all the continental land masses
(excluding Antarctica).4
The area dimension of the Continental Shelves, compared to the continental land, varies for various regions as
follows: 5
Continental United States
The Americas (exeluding
Continental United States)
Europe
Africa
Asia (excluding China)
U.S.S.R. and China
Australia and New Zealand

16.5%
20 %
38 %
5 %
30 %
25.5%
24 %
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Accordingly, some specific areas have
very extensive Continental Shelves, i.e.,
Java, Sumatra, Malacca, Bornco, south
of Bering Strait, east of Siberia, Australia, Guinea, east of Argentina, Korea,
and the North Sea. 6 Other areas lack
the Continental Shelf, like Chile and
Peru, though Biroe mentions that often
there is a Continental Shelf about 20
kilometers wide in a transitional zone
from the submarine bottom to the aerial
relief off the mountainous coasts.
A comparison of sources shows different estimates of the dimension of
shelves. To illustrate, Shepard, 8 Kuenen,9 and Carsey I 0 indicate that the
maximum width reaches to 800 miles,
the average width is about 42 miles, the
average depth is of 72 fathoms but may
reach 270 fathoms, and the average
slope of the Continental Shelf is about
0°07'. The slope mentioned is not uniform, the inner half of the shelf heing
steeper than the outer shelf. The flatness of the shelf or its uniform slope is a
general description since hollows and
hills of 20 meters and larger are frequently observed.
The predominant sediment of Continental Shelves is sand. Pebbles, cobbles,
and rock bottoms are also common in
the outer parts. The proximity to large
rivers is shown by a change of the
predominant sediment towards mud. I rStudies on the geological structure have
shown unconsolidated sediment overlying wedges of semi consolidated sediment. 12 In some of those Continental
Shelves the layer of sediment could be
as much as 6 to 12 kilometers. I 3
The formation of Continental
Shelves is not clearly understood so far,
although various theories have becn
advanced. Some investigators support a
depositional origin, but others think
wave erosion played a major role. Also,
there arc supporters of the theory that
hoth processcs could have acted together. 14 Geophysical studies showed
the origin of shelvcs have not been the
same everywhere. For example, the

subsidence of sedinwnts formed the
shelf off the eastern U.S. coast. I 5 The
lowering of the sca Icvcl during glacial
periods is of particular importance to
the possible development of shelves, hut
there is a broad divergence of opinion
regarding the estimation of maximum
sea lowering in the Pleistocene era. 16
Research on submarinc canyons could
be useful for a better explanation of the
phenomenon. 17
Waters covering the Continental
Shelves arc differentiated from the
waters heyond at greater dl~pthH. Thes(:
waters represent a hiological provinccthe neritic-in the habitats of marine
life. 18 Dilution, contamination by terrigenous sediments, penetration of natural light, and ease of development of a
nutrition chain give specific character to
the Continental Shelves. I 9
Influencing transmission of light in
the sea, material in suspension plays an
important role. Coastal waters can be so
densely contaminated with suspended
material that almost 50 percent of the
total light intensity received on the
surface can be absorbed in a meter
helow the sea level. The reflectivity of
the suspended partieles also affeels thewaters, altering their color. It is not
!>trange, tlwn, to see that from the d!'ep
hlue of the "oceanic desert" the color
changes in the marginal areas of the
shelves to a greenish blue or a green or
at times to shades of gray, brown, red,
or yellow. 2 0
The proximity of nutrients-phosphates, nitrates, and nitrites-to the
euphotic area and the more favorable
conditions for vertical movements in the
water masses account for a rich coastal
life. 21 Therefore, the Continental
Shelves are fertile areas for productive
fishing or abundant animal life and arc
more valuahle in thi!> respect than the
deeper oceans. TIH~ influent'(' of that
environment is not confined only to the
geographical limits of the shelves themselves.
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II-CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE:
LEGAL TRENDS REGARDING
CONTINENTAL SHELVES
International legislation of sovereignly of a coastal state's marginal
waters was born, probably, as a need for
safety. Whcn limitation was first
thought of, naval guns of short range
were the only possible threat to land
from offshore waters. The only extractive aClivities were fishing and the
search for valuable raw materials. Other
than these, exploitation, was not practical. Wilhin this century the laying of
submarine cables and development of
offshore oil extraction created needs for
a new definition of sovercignty. Howevcr, no definite declaralion was made
previous to the 1940's regarding national rights to resources on Continental
Shelves.
The first specific precedent goes hack
to 26 February 1942 with the bilateral
treaty between the United Kingdom and
Venezuela regarding exploitation of submarine oilfields in the Gulf of Paria. 1 A
major evenl was the proclamation of the
United Slates by President Truman on
23 September 1945 reserving for the
Uniled States, sovereignty on the seabed
and subsoil resources of the Continental
Shclf offshore to a depth of 100 fathoms. 2 Though there had been an
earlier international act (2 September
1947), the declaration of the InterAmerican Defense Zone considered
more than the Continental Shelf area
and was restricted to defense purposes. 3
No claim was made, at that time, of
economic implication, but Truman's
proclamation aroused a series of later
declarations of similar nature.
Differences in declarations on sovereignty on Continental Shclves arc noted
as follows: (a) the maximum dcpth to
which the claim was made, (b) the
nature of thc area. For examplc, on 29
October 1945, Mexico reserved all
natural riches of the adjacent Continental Shelf delimited by the 200-meter

isobath. 4 Argentina, on 9 October
1946, declared sovereignty over the
Argentine epicontinental sea and Continental Shelf but previously (24 January
1944) had declared those areas to be
zones of mineral reserves. s Costa Rica
and Honduras, on different dates, refer
to the submarine platform with no
indication of depth. Other nations followed: for example, the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia on 29 May 1949 extended
claims to areas in the Persian Gulf
contiguous to its coasts. A 19 May 1949
Iranian Bill refcrs to the Continental
Shclf without indicating a depth.6
Brazil, on 8 November 1950, established
hcr exclusive jurisdiction over the natural resources of the Continental Shclf as
well as for fishing in that area, differing
from Argentina only in the method. 7
The growing importance of fishing
operations led some countries to new
declarations of sovereignty of the watcrs
up to limits of 200 miles Qffshor.t7 but
without restraining freedom, of navigation by ships of other nations. Countries
without Continental Shelves made relatcd claims. For example, Chile and
Peru made proclamations on 25 June
1947 and 1 August 1947, respeetively.s
In the midst of those and other
claims, and undcr the prcssure of new
marine technologieal advances, lhe
United Nations celebrated the International Law Commission meetings of
1951, 1953, 1956 9 and the Geneva
Convention of the Continental Shelf of
1958. 10 Draft articles were prepared
with some changes which gave the
scheme of the Geneva Convention of
1958, currently the latest international
codification on the Continental Shelf. 11
In that conference a legal definition
of the shelf was established, and rights
of the coastal states were defined. Regarding the definition, the criterion has
been to leave a flexible margin of
adjustment to technological developments that is to interpret the Continental Shclf as the submarine bottom to
200 meters or beyond that limit if
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exploitation of natural resources was
feasible (article 1). In defined areas, the
right of exploitation by the coastal
states is exclusive, but sovereignty applies only to exploring and exploiting
natural resources (article 2.1). The eonvention clearly defines the term "natural resources" as those minerals, nonliving resources of the seabed and subsoil, as well as the living animals that at
the harvestable stage are immobile or
under the seahed or move in constant
physical contact with the bottom or
subsoil (article 2.4). The idea of sovereignty does not imply the superjacent
waters, where the concept of freedom
of the seas prevails (article 3). Also, no
coastal state may impede another nation's laying of submarine cables or
pipelines across its Continental Shelf
(article 4). The exclusive right to exploitation does not interfere with
oceanographic or scientific research by
other parties whenever those are done
with the intention of open puhlication
(article 5.1). A safety zone of only
500-meter radius around structures
erected for exploitation purposes is allowed. Those structures arc not to be
put up in disregard of the needs of
navigating international sealancs (article
5.2, 5.3). The codification explicitly
indicates that the opportunity for research by the coastal slate is necessary
(article 5.8).
In spite of its remarkable achievement, the Geneva codification offers
broad areas of potential disagreement.
The first of them is the delimitation of
the Continental Shelf. Other questions
include: What is an unjustifiable interference? What are essential sealanes to
.
. I naVIgatIOn.
. . 712
mternahona
The eonvention failed to provide for
compulsory settlement of disputes, thus
settlement is left to the states themselves. The majority of the participants
opposed mandatory use of the International Court of Justicc or other' suggested means of settlement. 13
The convention of Geneva came into

force on 10 June 1964 (article 1I.1).14
After June 1969 a revision is possible on
the request of the signing countries
(article 13.1).
In recent years, legislation and peaceful use of the ocean floors have become
the concerns of several countries represented in the United Nations. 1 S Since
new ideas on those matters are connected with the use of Continental
Shelves, it is desirable to mention possible legal trends. We can distinguish the
foIl owing possible attitudes: (a) to call a
new United Nations convention, (b) to
adopt the "wait and see" position expecting that conflicts will show future
courses of action, (c) the "national
lake" attitude, and (d) the "flag state
approach.,,16 Thosc policies have been
discussed relating to the high seas. But,
so far, the limit of the Continental Shelf
has been flexibly defined. Therefore, a
redefinition of the outer limit of the
Continental Shelf is involved in diseussion of the high seas legal status.
There is disagreement among nations
rcgurding the status of the high seas
beyond the Continental Slu,lf and oV!'r
it. I·'or the Continental Shdf, (~xploiln
tion of defincd resources is n rel~ogllized
national right. For the high seas, some
less powerful states desire instruments
of international control. The exlenl of
territorial waters is not agrt:ed upon.
Interests of different states are in conflict. The hig powcrs, like the Uniled
States, prefer (under the principle of
freedom of the seas) to retain a concept
of narrow territorial seas (equal to or
less than 12 miles, preferably 3 miles) to
restrain exclusive fishiny rights to a
narrow fringe (12 miles), 7 and to have
the United Nations redefine the rights
of countries to the Continental Shelves,
not yoing beyond the 200-meter
depth. 8 Small powers, such as some of
the Lutin American countries, tried to
extend their Sov(~rt!ip;nty, noL ollly tn
the soil and subsoil of their Conlinental
Shclves, but also to waters as far as the
extent of the shelf or even to a fixed
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large distance offshore, invoking the
principle of conservation of resources
(fisheries included) and economic development. 19
The latest concern regarding the use
of the seabed in the United Nations
meetings refleets a division in opinion
between the two major world powers
and the smaller countries. These concerns are in thc sphere of the security
field. Developing countries feel that that
poliey must be established to prevent
the growth of a new colonialism. The
major powers emphasize military diffcrences. The United States advocates
prohibition of emplacement of weapons
of mass destruction on the seabed and
deep ocean floor. The U.S.S.R. wants
use of the seabed beyond the territorial
waters to be reserved only for peaceful
purposes. 20
A proposAl made by the Ambassador
of Malta to the United Nations, Mr. A.
Pardo, tried to solve the problem of the
seabed and deep ocean floors through
international juridical mechanisms. 2 1

III-ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF
CONTINENTAL SELVES:
CURRENT POSSII3ILITIES AND
IMPLICATIONS ON NATIONAL OR
WORLDWIDE ECONOMY
The resources of the sea have been
heavily emphasized in the last decade.
1\10st of the frequently listed "marine
riehes" exist on all Continental Shelves.
Comparing possibilities with the deep
oceans, the shelves have the advantages
of shallower depths than the depths of
the sea and of nearness to populated
areas.
One way to judge the economic value
of sea resources could be through the
estimated $9 billion worth of ocean
aetivities which took place in 1963. This
amount is estimated to increase by 8 to
l!i percent yearly. I f WI' analyze thoge:
figures for tlw current vnluc of diffl:rcnt
resources, we observc that fishing,
petrolcum exploitation, mining and

mineral extraction, and seaweed farming
are the most significant. 1 Also, heavy
government expenses in research for
defense purposes reveals the double
importance of the marine environment.
From the items previously mentioned, fishing is one of the outstanding
economic activities, followed by petroleum extraction. All other commodities,
in general, run in a lower scale of value,
if military and paramilitary expenses are
excluded.
The importance of fishing for human
nourishment is well known, especially in
relation to the population explosion.
Fifty percent of the current world's
inhabitants have a protein deficiency.
Fish protein compares in protein content to that of meat, eggs, or milk. Also,
the unsaturated fats of fish oils have
dietary advantages. 2 If the lack of protein is critical now, the possibilities of
malnutrition in the future, unless tremendous technical developments in
farming on land are achieved, will be
huge. Theoretical studies indicate the
production capacity of animal protein
from the seas could be large cnough to
satisfy the diet of 30 billion people. 3
Estimates, based on studies off
southern California, indicate that the
production of zooplankton is 7.5 percent of thc total phytoplankton prodll(:tion and that fish, sea mammals, and
benthic animals reach only 3.4 percent
of the total phytoplankton produetion.4 Therefore, one solution for more
efficient use of food from the sea would'
be to shorten the feeding chain, trying
to make phytoplankton or zooplankton
edible for humans. To illustrate, 1,000
grams of phytoplankton convert into
100 grams of copepods. This, in turn,
means 10 grams of herring, implying
finally one gram for man. 5 The Russians
were experimenting with krill as a food
for man. Other possible uses arc as food
for dOJllct-ltic lind ollu:r IIninlllk 6
Continental Shclvcs arc thc areas of
most productive fishing. Almost 80 percent of the world catch comes from
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those areas and nearby zones. 7 The
Continental Shelves of the Northern
Hemisphere are about three times the
area of the Southern Hemisphere Continental Shelf areas, and top production
has been reached. I-Ience, the shelf areas
of the "oceanic hemisphere" will become more important in future efforts
to increase the world catch of fish. It is
interesting to note the most spectacular
jump in fish catch made by Peru is
precisely in the area of the Continental
Shelf, in regions benefited by convenient currents and nutrients. This
brings forth the question of the future
possibilities of increasing the world
catch through pelagic fishing. For a
better catch, equipment will have to be
improvcd.8 It is reasonable to cxpect
that Continental Shelves will keep their
importance as the main fishing grounds.
Therefore, we can forecast a pressure
towards research and exploratory fishing in the probably fertile areas of the
Southern Hemisphere. This will require
the development of large new fishing
fleets with the capability of proccssing
their catchcs through factory mother
ships. The Russians already showed this
trend in their opcration in the Argcntine
Continental Shelf in the last few years.
As was mentioned, the coastal areas
of the less devcloped countries will he
the new grounds for fishing. Thos~
countries generally lack the means required for the best methods and they
will be, therefore, out of competition.
We can foresee that those activities may
generate areas of conflict. The maladies
of probable overfishing in those regions
is a real danger. Consequences of overfishing have been proven with the
forced interruptions of World Wars I
and II in Europe9 and in the halibut
fishing in the northeastern Pacific and
on the Grand Banks. 10 That fear is the
cause of disagreement in the current
juridical status of soVt'rt'ignty on ContiIlt'ntal Shrives legislated unilatcrally by
different eouJltries.
Current exploitation of minerals at

sea, eompared with the potential, is
meager. The reasons for the small-scalc
cxploitation includc a lack of convenient information, lack of appropriate
technology, and a nonurgent need to
resort to that source of minerals. 11 A
good proof of the last is the case of
pctroleum exploitation. Even offshore
mining of that material, which started in
1899, developed only after World War
II. In a period of 10 years, ending in
1967, offshore oil production reached
16 percent of the tolal world production. 12 In the United Slales alone,
offshore natural gas production reached
977 billion cubic feet. 13 Offshore oil
production of the United Slates equals
that of the rest of the world, with the
Persian Gulf accounting for 75 pcrcent
of the ,production outside the Uniled
States. 1 The potential oil exploitation
in the North Sea is well revealed by the
interest shown in lhe 5-year exploration
period begun by 23 groups of different
oil companies. The possibilities of natural gas supplies discovered in the same
area seem to be able to rcpluce the coal
gas used in the area within the next 20
years. 1S
Eslimates of reserves for the next 10
years indicate that offshore oil production will account for 40 percent of the
world's extraction. 1';stimall'H [01' the
Arctic Conlinental Shelf in the'i'yumen
region show that by 1980 oil production thcre will equal thc current production of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. 16 Other shelf areas of the
world in the Southern Hemisphere seem
ready to start offshore oil exploitation
on a large scale. In some places close to
the coast, offshore exploitation began in
1932.17 Other estimates by W.E. Pratt
(1951) indicate Continental Shclf oil
reserves are approximately 1,000 billion
harrels, equaling oil reserves of contiJlI'nlai areas. 18
Rights to PI!troit'lIm I'xpillitntillll
from lhe shdf are dl':lrly defincd in the
last Geneva Convention already discussed. The convcntion assures benefits
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for the coastal statc. A nation's profit,
however, wiJI depend upon its technology and the feasihility of extraction.
i\lining and extractive activitics from
the Continental Shelves can be divided
into two categories: exploiting the
riches of the soil and subsoil and extraction of minerals and salts from the sea
water, whieh ineludes the conversion of
salt water into fresh water. We shall
discuss at more length the first type of
exploitation, since extraction of s,"llts
and minerals is casily accomplished
from territorial waters. Though we shall
mention mining operations, some of
them are done also in the beachcs.
Continental Shelves are about 20
percent of the continental lands. As the
rocks of Continental Shelves do not
differ basically from rocks on land, one
can expect the same average mineral
potential in those submarine soils. On
beaches, due to the mechanical forces of
the ocean surf, mining and processing
arc relatively simple. The sea level variations of the Pleistocene age, during
presumed stabilization periods, give
good mining possibilities for old offshore beaches, now submerged.! 9
Glauconite, a possihlc source of
potassium, is found in various offshore
locations. Phosphorite is found' off Peru,
l\lexico, Chile, the Unit(!d States, Argentina, Japan, South Africa, and certain
submerged areas off islands in the
Indian Ocean. Tin is found in drowned
river valleys offshore in Thailand and
Indonesia. Also in drowned river valleys
are deposits of gold, platinum, and
diamonds. Some of those areas arc off
Nome and Good News Bay in Alaska
and the Orange River in South-West
Africa.2o
Iron ore and coal have been mined
from the subsea floor for a long time,
but the mines were entered from the
coast, as is donc in England, .I apan,
Newfoundland, iII111 1"inland,21 Sulphur
is also found in the caps of salt dOlllcs.
Large concentrations of those domes
have been surveyed in the offshore areas

of the Gulf of Mcxico. Also, in the Gulf
of Mexico, as well as offshore Iceland,
notable calcareolls shell d(!posits exist,
used as raw material for the manufachire of portland cement. From the
offshore areas of eastern Texas alone,
45 million tons of shells have been
obtained in the last 20 years. 22 Also,
there are deposits of magnetite, columbite, ilmenite, zircon, rutile, monazite,
and silica in different areas of the
world. 23
Extraction from sea water of salts
and minerals with concentrations
smaller than those of boron is not
economical, using current methods. Of
some of those economically feasible to
exploit, offshore minerals for which
there arc adequate land reserves arc not
practically extracted. However, magnesium, sodium chloride, potassium compounds, bromine, and chemicals used in
the manufacture of gypsum are obtained from sea water, mostly in the
United States.24
Extraction of fresh water from salt
water has been performed only in
limited coastal areas due to its high cost.
Therefore, we shall not discuss that
activity. We also shall leave aside the
possibilities of using the physical phenomena of the ocean as a source of
energy, which, except in one case, is in
the project stage and of strict coastal
interest. 25
Seaweed is farmed mostly iii territorial waters, though it could be harvested in some areas outside of those.
Seaweed is economically important and
can have several uses: food for men and
cattle and as a source of iodine, potash,
alginic acids, a1ginates, agar-agar, and
fertilizer. 26
Comparing future possibilities to the
reality of Continental Shelf mining, it is
worth noting a recent I-year study was
conducted hy Economic Af;Sociates,
Ine., with support of Oe(!an 111111 Engineering, Inc. and some University of
Maryland consultants. The st~dy aims
primarily at nonliving resources on the
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u.s. shelves. The published conclusion
states that of the 50 materials existing
on the shelves, only a handful are vital
for the U.S. economy in case of shortage or price rise. Oil and gas are mentioned as worthwhile mining resources.
Recommendations of the report emphasize the need for more comprehensive
studies of the U.S. continental margins. 27
Such a declaration by a major user of
natural resources in the most advanced
economy is worthy of special consideration. However, it is dangerous to generalize, since the land resources in the
United States are seldom found in other
countries. Also, it is worth considering
that exploitation of mineral resources at
sea, even at moderate depths, requires a
solid technology; therefore, in most
cases, advanced countries will play an
active role in seabed exploitation wherever it is done. Moreover, a detailed
scientific knowledge of the areas of
Continental Shelves intended for exploitation is essential.
IV-MARINE TECHNOLOGY:
ITS CURRENT POSSIBILITIES
ON CONTINENTAL SHELVES
Operations on the Continental
Shelves, as well as on the decp sca
bottom, depend on oceanographic
knowledge, engineering techniques, and
an understanding of man's physiology. 1
Development of new materials, reliable
and resistant to tremendous pressures,
although light, implies great progress in
the capability for deep sea operation. It
is easily understandable that the attainment of that commitment will involveand has involved-multiple technology
proficiency.
After the Truman proelamation,
activities and technology interacted in a
continuous and more intense ye;trly
trend. All thosc activities have becn
directed usually towards: (a) increasingly deeper and freer individual human
operations in tIle sea;2 (b) development

of more versatile vehicles capable of
reaching deeper ranges, of manned,
unmanned, and robot forms;3 and (e)
development of techniques for direct
and indirect knowledge of the sea and
its boundaries.4
The development of the aqualung by
Jacques Yves Cousteau in 1943 was a
milestone for future progress in the
exploration of Continental Shelves. The
Krasberg lung with a controlled amount
of oxygen and the use of a closed
breathing system of a helium and oxygen atmosphere was another important
advance for reaching increasing depths
in diving. 5 Other major steps were
established through operations "Continental Shelves," "Sealab," and the
project "Man-in-the-Sea." The first
operation began in 1962 and proved the
ability of man to live and work for long
periods of time in the sea. Those first
trials were surpassed by the achievements of Sealabs I and II. New shelters
were tested, longer numbers of days and
men were involved, and flexible structures like the SPlD (Submersible Portable In(latable Dwelling) were tried
successfully.6 Experiences of Sealab II
showed aquanauts were able to stay 15
to 30 days continuously under 205 feet
of water. 7 Scalah III, scheduled for tllll
autumn of 1968, planned t~ advance
the previous experiments in the field of
oceanography, engineering, salvage and
construction, biology, and use of
trained mammals for helping aquanauts. 8 Unfortunately the death of one
of the aquanauts, Mr. Berry L. Gannon,
the cause of which was not clear,
interrupted the experiment. 9
A group of divers from California,
working with specially designed gear,
were able to perform tasks at 600 feet.
Another system, the "Cachalot," developed by \V eSlinghouse, al\ows uninterrupted diving and living in a highpressure atmosphere of oxygen-heliumnitrogen. With that system, longer
periods of useful operation, greater
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safety, and savings of time are obtained. 1o
~'Bathysphere,"
"benthoseope,"
"bathyscaph" and "Trieste" are pioneers in reaching great depths. Sinee 23
January 1960, when the last reached
35,800 feet in the deepest part of the
Marianas Treneh, several submersibles
have been launched. After the diving
saucers created by Cousteau, other inventors increased the capabilities of
earlier vehieles. Among those, we can
mention "Deep Qucst," which is 40 feet
long and carries 7,000 pounds of equipmcnt for special use for prospecting for
minerals on Continental Shelves. The
PX-15, because of its capabilitie; of
floating freely, is of special value for
biological and acoustical observations. 11
Besidcs specific oceanographic instrumcntation, photography, television,
seismic refraction and reflection, sound
transmission. and magnctometry have
been powerful means for extending
man's knowledge of the bottom of the
Continental Shelves. Submarine photography was attempted in 1895 by Boutan, but it took several years before the
proper lighting and gear were obtained. 12 Underwater television combincd with sonar and lifting gear assemhled in special devices like CU It V
(Cable Controlled Underwater Recovery
Vehiele) is able to locate and recover
objects from the bottom, such as the
hydrogen bomb lost at Palomares,
Spain. Some underwater television
systems, like the one developed by the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, can work
at 1,000 feet and obtain elear ima~es
with as little light as one foot-candle. 3
Present capabilities to deploy instruments and equipment in floating or
fixed platforms required long ycars of
engincering cxperience. Now, large
buoys likc the Nomad c:m he S:lfdy
nnchorcd in the tll'l'P ol'cnn. Also plntforms, eSRenlinl for drilling offshore,
have grown considernhly in size. The
state of the art ,that allowed, until only

recently, 200 feet as a maximum depth
of extraction began to make further
progress with different modes of operation. Since 1963 the introduction of
floating platforms permitted hopes of
not only greater exploitable depths but
reduced costs and gave greater mobility
and better seaworthiness. 14 In 1967 a
huge floating platform built in the
United States and towed to Africa
began to operate in 300 fect of water.
The Submarex, a converted patrol ship,
could drill in 1,500 feet of water.
Records of a 242 foot barge, the Blue
Water, showed an aptitude for withstanding waves of 28 feet and winds of
65 miles per hour without suspending
drilling operations. 1 5
The mining of most minerals from
the sea is not as advanced as the
techniques for the exploitation of oil.
Hydraulic or bucket dredge is used for
most mincrals. 16 The situation has
changed with new Deep Submersible
Vehieles (DSV) like the Quest and the
abilities of man to dive to llte bottom of
Continental Shelves.
The high reliability of automatic
systems and the natural adwntnges of
the Continental Shelf seem ~o open
wide hopes for the installation of nuc1enr plants on the senbed. The nlmost
infinite radiation shield and infinite
isothermal sink, a naturally pressurized
environment, and isolation in the event
of disaster are the main advantages of
that location, In that case, Continental
Shelves adjacent to populated areas
would be suitable "service areas. ,,1 7
The above review has shown that the
progress of technology allows 11S smallscale operations to all depths of almost
all Continental Shelves. The feasibility
of enlarging that potential depcnds on
industrial developmcnts such as superstrength plastics, ~)owcr pncknges, deep
mooring uevicl's,1 hl~tter knowledge of
the composition and soil mechanics of
the holtom floors, better structure
foundations,1 9 and tests on the aptitude of man to withstand high-pressured
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special atmosphercs. 2 0 The success of
operating automatic systems is also of
major importance for special tasks
where man cannot be exposed. It is also
clear that any of those operations will
require high technological standards,
expensive devices, and big groups of
qualified personnel able to work as
teams. Therefore, this sort of operation
will be restricted in the immediate
future to a few nations of the world.
V-NAVAL APPLICATIONS:
POSSIBLE MILITARY
EXPLOITATION OF
CONTINENTAL SHELVES
Land bases have been and probably
will continue to be the main support for
naval forces. Navies must cross Continental Shclves where much effort has
been put into offensive and defensive
weapon systems which have greatly
changed with time. Before the development of the submarine, coastal batteries, rudimentary mines, and naval
forces were the main threats to other
naval forces transiting the Continental
Shelves. Submarines and aviation have
changed the scene. Developments in
mine devices converted the shelves into
areas of greater danger before World
War I, but achievements in underwater
vehicles and techniques have ereated 11
revolution since World War II.
To estimate the new possibilities
open, it is convenient to focus the
discussion on mobility, weapons operations, and related problems.
Nuclear submarines led to operational capabilities difficult to conceive
before the 1950's. Currently they can
reach the maximum depths of the Continental Shelves, manoeuver at very high
speeds, l and operate for long periods of
time. Special submersible vehicles can
also reach all depths of Contincnt;11
Shelves, with limited purposes. A military submarine, the USS Dolphin,
launched on 8 June 1968 and operational now, represents a new asset in the

deep submergence submarine vehicles
list. Her research equipment weighs
more than 12 tons, and she has more
sonar devices than any other submarine.
The Dolphin is engaged in classified
research, and her capabilities are currently evaluated. 2 With the latest experiences of the Man-in-the·Sea Project,
the mobility of man himself on the
bottom of the shelves has been tested.
That implies the possibility of laying
implements on the bottom of the
shelves and attending them or performing other tasks. Manipulation
capabilities of special vehicles, manned
or unmanned, have been provided and
improved, as has the knowledge of
divers, whieh can be combined with a
great uplifting power, i.e., with "Hardiman" (Human Augmentation Research
and Development Investigation). 3
Deployment of weapon systems on
the Continental Shelves and in the
superjacent waters can encompass planting of mines, establishing of static
Suhroc launchers, establishing fixed or
mobile ballistic missile launching platforms, operation of guided underwater
systcms, and conventional operations in
antisubmarine warfare.
The feasibility of placing fixed or
mobile weapons systems on the bottom
depcnds heavily on the nature of hoth
the bottom and the structure. Knowledge of soil mechanics is important. The
U.S. Bureau of Docks has been conducting studies of deep ocean installations. One author, a participant in those
studies, concludes that loads up to
10,000 pounds can be placed with
current techniques,4 but undoubtedly
the knowledge of the constitution of
the boLtom is essential. s Areas of loosc
sediment, and especially ooze, will be
difficult or inconvenient zones, even for
landing suhmersible vehicles, and could
;Jct us traps.6 I3csides knowh'd~c of the
soil mcl'il:lIIics, a dl'luilt'(1 surv('y of tIll'
relief of the bottom will be importunt
for picking out possible emplacement
sites.
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The manned operation of those stations will be closely linked to developments in power packages and in resupply facilities. The importance of
both features is evident; the lesser the
frequency of visits to those stations the
better will be their secrecy of location.
The loss oC concealment is a serious
detriment for an underwater offensivedefensive system, and the discovery of
an offensive system installed on the
enemy's Continental Shelf implies its
almost sure destruction.
Some people envh;age the fruits of
current experiences like Sealab as the
foundation for more ambitious projects
of underwater nuclear submarine bases.
They would make it possible to service,
to resupply, and to change crews for
military submarines without having
them surface or go back to their land
bases so frequently.7 Although to diseuss this seems premature, it is worth
while to note the concern about the use
of seamounts for that and other purposes. s
One way to improve the concealment
of underwater missile stations is to place
them underground. If engineers could
afford this type of construction, at least
at the depths of the Continental
Shelves, the tllsk of identifying and
locating them would be considerably
more difficult than for stations resting
on the boltom. 9
The use of underwater missile stations for defensive operations against
submarines or surface forces does not
seem to be practical. The advantage of
mobility, if the first firing is not a kill, is
missing. The system is expensive and for
attacking surface forces can be substituted with other mobile weapon systems. Regarding submarine counterattacks, a combination of guided systems with surface and submarine ships
seems to he more advanlageous.
Usually all defensive systems put up
on the shclves will need systems for
detection and classification, except
those weapon systems functioning

under the specified premise of automatie firing. For the purpose of detection, the Continental Shelf will provide
a lengthened warning analogous to that
obtained by the DEW line. Advantages
gained through the SOFAR studies,!O
transducers able to perform reliably at
great pressures, 11 and methods of antisubmarine warfare environmental predietion! 2 let us conceive of outer shelf
detection systems that could efficiently
alert us of possible intruders on the
Continental Shelf.
The use of previously described
means would imply new demands o.n
geophysical detailed surveys of the Continental Shelves where operations are
planned, especially navigation aids and
efficient underwater communieations
systems.
VI-STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS:
FORMER FACTORS IN THEIR
GLOBAL INTERACTION AND
THE PROJECTION OF FORCE
FROM THE SEA
We have seen how the riches of the
Continental Shelves are open to exploitation and also how those zones are
useful for military applications. Both
features widen the spectrum of possible
conflicts, frictions, and areas of possihlll
dispute in war. Economie incentives and
economic objectives are essential for
nations' progress. The protection and
expansion of those objectives include an
important body of peacetime strategies.
Our world does not have true peace, and
the opposition of two major blocs is
forcing a deployment of military means
through strategies that look for favorable relative positions. The areas under
study fall within two main spheres of
action: economy and war. Therefore,
their connections with politics and a
recourse to force have to be looked for
in hoth fields.
The current economic importance of
the shelves can be summarized in their
riches as world fishing grounds and
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sources for petroleum exploitation and
mineral extraction. Of those activities,
the first two are of paramount importance. Mineral extraction will increase if
economic incentives or want of important materials surpasses the current
technological and economic drawbacks.
But the need for those materials is easy
to conceive if man continues in a
"dispendious mood" (extravagant and
wasteful) regarding natural resources. It
can be argued that intensive extraction
has stimulated new developments and
that substitutes havc been found in the
history of economic and industrial
development. Anyway, that optimistic
theory that rests on unlimited possibilities, although hopeful, is not always
real. The highly industrialized countries,
unless the trend is changed, will be the
ones most in need of those sea reserves.
Legal possession of soil and subsoil
Continental Shelf riches is clearly defined by the Geneva Convention, in
spite of its imperfections. However, the
entitlement to those riches does not
mean the feasibility of direct exploitation, since the ability to exploit is
limited to less than a handful of countries. Exploitation is always possihle,
using another's techniques through contracts or concessions, with some of the
benefits, wishes, and interest of hilateral
or multilateral parties involved, cveil
though these might not always coincide.
On that occasion, indirect pressures or
political actions, the pursuing of one's
national interests, could give place to
frictions or conflicts of different magnitude. Those conflicts will usually encompass one or more countries of a
well-developed stage and one of those in
the developing stage, most frequently
the legal owner of the prospected riches.
Exploitation is generally preceded by
the exact knowledge of what is worth
exploiting. Previous surveys are always
necessary to assure success. Prospecting
is an expensive activity and requires in
its exploratory phases a great deal of
scientific and .teehnieal skills. In these

cases the pattern of conflict between
the possible explorers and owners of the
shelves is repeated. Differences or conflicts regarding knowledge of another's
Continental Shelf can well precede
other conflicts. It is worth noting that
scientific enterprises can cover, at times,
some of those operations. Article 5.8 of
the Geneva Convention on Continental
Shelves states:
Nevertheless the coastal state
shall not normally withhold its
consent if the request to research
is submitted by a qualified institution with a view to purely scientific research into the physical or
biological characteristics of the
continental shelf suhject to the
proviso that the coastal state shall
have the right, if it so desires, to
participate or to be represented in
the research and that in any event
the results shall be published. 1
That restriction of rights is made
with the open intention of preventing a
state from hampering the development
of scientific knowledge. On the other
hand, how can one he assured that
scientific data is to be used only for
scientific purposes and that the published resulLs arc the only rl:sulls? That
does not hal'[H:n in marine n!Hl!areh at
least. Although the participation of the
coastal country is afforded in the convention, great disparity of technological
levels cannot assure that the supervision
is effective.
Therefore, we can conclude that
when thc exploitation of the resources
of the Continental Shclves would involve high interests and the resources
would not appertain to the advanced
countries making thc exploitation itself,
frictions and conflicts-natural or provoked-might be abundant.
Although conflicts arc possible, more
immediately important are conflicts on
the Continental Shclves involving fishing
activities. Several examples in the past
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showed that in those cases not only
political, hut military, action has been
used as a means of enforcing a determined course of action. The difficulty
in a successful definition of the area of
exclusive fishing rights is another proof
of the clash of national interests. 2
Fishing is the oldest sea resource exploited and also of the most importance. It is then natural that this field
contains the largest record of frictions.
Again, technology and economic
development prcscnt opposing interests
for devcloped and devcloping countries.
The superpowers and big fishing nations
want no territorial restrictions heyond a
narrow fringe of coastal waters. Mean·
while, the smaller and less·developed
powers look for wide margins of exclusive fishing rights. The Soviet Union,
due to security reasons, docs not share
the opinion of the United States.3
Tlw amhiguity of the Geneva Convention regarding sedenta?, species,
mentioned in article 2A, brought
about other conflicts, due to its interpretation, such as the one between
Bra;~il and Franee.s
The effects of overfishing in tradi·
tional areas and the desire to increase
the catch make countries with growing
economics or those depending on fishing to direct their eyes towards new
areas. Continental Shelves and slopes of
remote places arc suitable places for
fishing when adequate fishing fleets and
techniques arc availahle. In that posi·
tion, the freedom to fish in the most
profitable regions is a logical policy to
sustain. The less·developed countries,
which lack modern techniques, emphasize the danger of overfishing and the
need for conservation of the natural
resources in front of their coasts. In
some countries, for example, the
balance of fishing captures has implieatiow; for otlH'r inllu:;tril':; :meh m; th('
gUllno inllll::try in p('ru.
'I'll<' lIl'l'tI for gn'lIter lInimal protein
would justify operations thllt arc also
economically advlmtageous. Also, para-

doxically, most of those starving nations
arc in front of the sea with good
prospects of abundant fish, but they
lack the human and material resources
to make fishing operations economically
successful.
Looking at the subject from the
other side, is it illogical not to harvest
the seas where fishing is convenient?
That is a waste of resources offered by
nature. That harvest will fulfill its cycle
of life anyhow. The key is really to
determine the correct levcl of the catch
and how to make sure that that levcl is
respected. For that, a good knowledge
of population dynamics is essential, and,
in most cases, for the probably new
fishing grounds those studies are
missing.
Solutions to these situations could be
sought through multilateral, bilateral, or
unilateral means. Multilateral efforts
have not always been successful. Unilateral enforcement usually leads to
naval action as a means of enforcing the
regulations on intruders. 6 Previously it
was pointed out the probable difference
in power among prospective litigants
regarding sea exploitation conflicts;
therefore, enforcement of unilateral
declarations of exclusive rights very
frequently, if preceded hy a naval
action, would be followed hy politi<:111
action in one of the several international
forums or in the United Nations. Conciliation of opposing interests cannot be
e~sily seen at the present unless enforcement is found through multilateral
agreement on the basis of mutual conveniences. Those agreements will not he
easily carried out. Therefore, Continental Shelf waters would be areas of
intense naval deployment and patrolling
by some countries.
Partial or large damage to a country's
economy done by overfishing in its
('oa~lal W:lII'1"$ dl'(H'III(:: upon th(' (''(ll'nt
111O~1' walc'l'~ lire 1I~1'(1 1111 fillhing grountlll
:lnd to the imporl:lllcl~ of fishing to its
economy. The magnitude of the operations and the period for which they
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have to be sustained would depend on
specific situations. This cold war operation is feasible in a tense world. To be
ignorant of what is happening and to
resort to political or military wnys of
cOllnteraction for a rclatively exLended
period of time diminishes the expectnney of this conflict. In any ca~e,
knowledge of the resources and their
natural dynamics and reconnaissance
through naval or other paramilitary
units would be some of the means of
assuring some validity to claims towards
pretended "aggressors."
In spite of the previously mentioned
conflicts involving the Continental Shclf
areas, naval hostilities of a cold or hot
war will provide the broadest use of
them. The two major political and
military blocs of the world show a
different dependence on sea operations.
The free world counts on the unresLricted use of the sea for transportation
of goods and mcn. The Communist
world, on the other hand, has a growing
interest in the sea as a means of defeating the enemy by annihilation of
those streams of trade and logistics vital
to the maritime nations. I\s a new trend
today, the Communist nations seem to
be aware of the economic benefits of
controlling the sea through shipping and
new courses of action which shape what
is difficult to define as merely an
economic strategy. 7
Within that frame a considerable
deployment of military force at sea
provides offensive and defensive systems
by both blocs. Those forces keep an
almost equal value, either in conventional or nuclear war, since they partially participate at length in the latter.
The Continental Shelves, as we have
seen, provide alternately for aggression
and defense. However, to make their use
feasible requircs high technology and a
good knowledge of the areas concerned.
For the free world, the United States,
the United Kingdom, Japan, and France
lead in marine technology, being the
first countries prominent in all fields of

that technology. On the other hand, the
Soviet Union has shown a tremendous
increase in her capahilities and inlc:rest
in ocean sciences. Iler buildup on an
important research Ilel't nnd of a large
fishing Ilel:t, which undoubtl'dly acts liM
a simultaneous collector of data intdli·
gl'nCI\ hlls spread Communist man tim.:
operations worldwide. Some scientists
speculate the Soviets arc behind the
United States in marine science. Their
knowlcdge of some areas, however, sllch
as the I\rctic, is beLter. Thl're is evidence
thllt they apply great effort to military
oceanographic research. 8
Information on Soviet underwater
experience is scarce. IIowever, we can
presume a rising effort, since in June
1968 an underwater laboratory, the
"Chernomov," was being tested in the
Black Sea. The design of that laboratory
seems to be below the Sealab III level,
but it is known that new underwater
vehieles arc being developed. 9
Both major blocs have nuclear sub·
marines capable of delivering nuclear
weapons from ranges of about 2,500
nautical miles for the United States lind
an lIsslIlIled range of tj·OO nautical lIIiJ!!1:!
for the Soviet Union. The laLLer range
estimate is an approximation. It was
estimated that the Soviets lag 10 years
behind the submersible capabilities of
the United States. Let us assume for
both about equal ranges as well as
comparable aptitude for underwater
launehing. 1 0 ~:ven with their respective
differences, both weapons systems arc
capable of inflicting tremendous damage
to industrial complexes as well as a
heavy number of casualties.
Usually a Fleet Ballistic Missile Suh·
marine (SSJ3N) will attack as far as
possihle from the enemy shoreline and
the horder of the Continental Shelf.
Ilowever, the selection of inland targets
OJ' lhl! particular Ill'eds of inercasill~
failure~ in the navi~alioll systems could
oblige the attacking submarine to cross
the Contillental Shelf. III both cases,
dl!tl!etion of the intruder as far as
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possible is vital for his destruction before his weapons can be launched.
The surveillance system installed on
the Continental Shelf and complemented by a deep occan system, fixed
or mobile, would be invaluable. Such a
surveillance system combined with a
guided weapons system could provide
one apt response in the short amount of
reaction this sort of attack allows.
Probably it is within that frame that
projects Trident and Artemis merged 11
and the Atlantic Underwater Tactical
Evaluation Center operations arc
tested. 12
Other strategic shelves where the
probable Fleet Ballistic Missile Launchers exit may. provide installations of
complementary detection systems, that
through convenient communications
allow better intelligence of the enemy's
movements. 13 Those systems will require considerable expense, a good level
of secrecy for keeping the efficiency of
the system, and a good display of
technology .
The use of undcrwater mobile or
fixed platforms for offensive purposcs
from the enemy's Continental Shelf is
difficult to conccive as convenient. The
advantage of such a strategic deployment could be for launching missiles or
as a base for underwater opcrations. Thc
first use would be elaborate, expensivc,
and conscqucntly aimed only towards
important objectives that cannot bc
rcached by other means and where
surprise is important. But there are
serious adverse factors; primary objectives usually would bc in areas of highly
sophisticated defense systems, operations for laying the necessary devices
will be seriously impaired at times or
impossible to execute. The use of the
Continental Shclf for putting up small
underwater bases, easy to construct and
with limited objectives, is a more
feasible method.
Underwater antiballistic missile stations on a shelf could imply a convcnient defensive deployment for

destruction of multiple warhead missiles
before the separation point. Those stations would enjoy concealment within
the premises commented upon in the
previous chapter.
Continental Shelves are suitable
grounds for mine and countermine warfare operations. Mobile underwater stations could operate for both types of
actions within a reasonable radius, depending on tasks, weapons, and levels of
risks admitted. The laying of special
weapons of large destructive force on
detlmnined spots of thc ocean bottom is
conceivablc with current technology. If
those weapons can be rendered active at
will a long time after being laid, operations in strategic areas of thc world by
one of the major blocs in belligerence
could achieve a military advantage and
could be expected. Do those weapons
exist, and have some of them already
been deployed? Secrecy on modern
developments make that a difficult
question to answer with reasonable
accuracy.
The natural characteristic granted to
objccts laid on the Continental Shelves,
concealmcnt, Icd us to one of the most
immcdiate uses of Continental Shelves,
in the case of needing secrecy for some
undetcrmined reasons. Thosc areas arc
availahle for hiding weapOII!! or deviecH,
provided surveillance of thc zone is
possible or intruders are discarded.
Exploitation of this course of action is
varied and reaches different scales of
operations, covering from peacetime
operations to insurgeney, espionage, or
conventional aetions. Coastal or shelf
areas of underdeveloped countries could
be sanctuaries for these types of operations, since their surveillance is deficient.
So far, our discussion has put us on
the verge of utopia, at least for some
skeptical people who havc not witnessed
the current pace of undcrwater opcrations. Unfortunately, when these matters arc discussed from a public information vicwpoint, the elements of proof
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are scarce. It is natural that high military developments are subjected to a
level of secrecy directly proportional to
the amount of innovation that the
weapon or development implies. Anyway, our review of underwater activities
can show us that progress made in this
area lets us be suspicious that new
possibilities in maritime warfare can
complicate severely the currently
known status.
How does all that affect diffl!rent
countries? Evidently, for conOicts of a
small scale, the implications are not so
large; but for large-scale conflicts the
efforts wiII have to be redoubled since
the three dimensional frame achieved in
World Wars I and II has been enlarged
considerably through the action of more
capable sl}bmersible vehicles and a man
less restricted on water. The Continental
Shelves emerge \ within that scene as a
double source of effect and conOictseconomic and military. Both are important factors either in peace, cold war, or
hot war situations. Of course, the Continental Shelves of both superpowers
and immediate areas wiII he the most
vital areas. There, the systems of attack
and defense wiII compete heavily. The
surveillance of those areas appears critical, and that task will impose arduous
work.
The current technology and high
interest involved in worldwide strategies
lets us say that those uses analyzed, and
probably other uses of the Continental
Shelves, pose a real danger of a complex
escalation of a cold war game on the
continental margins.
Since the economic side should not
be neglected as a source of pressure and
friction, an early agreement on a juridical and more complete status of the
bottom of the shelves, seabed, and the
waters superjacent should prevent further complexitics of the world's political-military situation. l4
To' reach that reliable status will
involve tremendous difficulties due to
~he differences in opinion because of

strong national interests. The unrestricted principle of freedom of the
seas probably can no longer be held if
the balance of power is to he kept in its
current status. Even the principles of
freedom of navigation and unimpeded
scientific and economic research will
have to be revised.
In any case, the surveillance of Continental Shelves and assurance of fulfillment of agreements wiII involve an
effort impossible ls or very difficult to
perform with current means. However,
those coastal nations which do not or
can not develop underwater technology
and operational capabilities to operate
at the levels of the Continental Shelves
will be economically and militarily inferior in the face of future changes
affecting maritime areas.

VII-CONCLUSIONS
The Continental Shelves have considerable natural wealth. They are important for fishing, petroleum exploitation, and some mineral extraction. If
more emphasis were put on mining
certain matcrials, these resources of
wealth could play an even more significant role.
The feasibility of operations on Continental Shelves is presently restricted to
small-scale operations, but, with experience, the field is expanding for some
of the most advanced countries. The
impact of those advancements is felt in
both economic and military fields.
Major progress is noted, not only in
diversity of operations, hut also in the
accuracy and range of action of the
whole field. The ability of man to work
at increasingly greater depths has multiple implications in that progress.
The increase of new capabilities complicates remarkably any major war in
which the leading countries would be
involved, sincc the military use of the
Continental Shelves would he of great
advantage. In general, we can say that
new technologies are broadening the
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area of naval concern. Detection and
surveiIIanee arc enlarged to a great
extent through the usc of the Continental Shelves. General surveiIIanee will
be necessary for each country's security.
Offensive-defensive systems which can
be installed on the Continental Shelves
within the present state of the art or in
the near future enlarge the spectrum of
current strategies. Either deterrence or
retaliation wi1l have new systems entering the stage in the near future, unless
current trends are changed.
The possibilities mentioned indicate

that early and worldwide agreement
about the use of Continental Shelves
and deep ocean soils would be wise. To
reach agreements will be arduous, but
agreements may be one means of preventing an escalation of underwater
warfare.
Whether that aim is reached or not,
the nations with better marine technologies, knowledge of the oceans, and
know-how will have a great advantage in
the strategic use of the Continental
Shelf in war as well as for immediate
exploitaLion of nalural resources.
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